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The Knowledge of Preconditions principle (KoP) is proposed as a widely applicable connection
between knowledge and action in multi-agent systems. Roughly speaking, it asserts that if some
condition ϕ is a necessary condition for performing a given action α , then knowing ϕ is also a neces-
sary condition for performing α . Since the specifications of tasks often involve necessary conditions
for actions, the KoP principle shows that such specifications induce knowledge preconditions for
the actions. Distributed protocols or multi-agent plans that satisfy the specifications must ensure
that this knowledge be attained, and that it is detected by the agents as a condition for action. The
knowledge of preconditions principle is formalised in the runs and systems framework, and is proven
to hold in a wide class of settings. Well-known connections between knowledge and coordinated
action are extended and shown to derive directly from the KoP principle: a common knowledge
of preconditions principle is established showing that common knowledge is a necessary condition
for performing simultaneous actions, and a nested knowledge of preconditions principle is proven,
showing that coordinating actions to be performed in linear temporal order requires a corresponding
form of nested knowledge.
Keywords: Knowledge, multi-agent systems, common knowledge, nested knowledge, coordinated
action, knowledge of preconditions principle.
1 Introduction
While epistemology, the study of knowledge, has been a topic of interest in philosophical circles for cen-
turies and perhaps even millennia, in the last half century it has seen a flurry of activity and applications
in other fields such as AI [19], game theory [2] and distributed computing [13]. At least in the latter two
fields a particular, information-based, notion of knowledge plays a prominent and useful role.
This paper proposes an essential connection between knowledge and action in such a setting. Using
doesi(α) to denote “Agent i is performing action α” and Kiϕ to denote that Agent i knows the fact ϕ ,
the connection can intuitively be formulated as follows:
The KNOWLEDGE OF PRECONDITIONS Principle (KoP):
If ϕ is a necessary condition for doesi(α)
then Kiϕ is a necessary condition for doesi(α)
This statement appears deceptively simple. In fact, many successful applications of knowledge to the
design and analysis of distributed protocols over the last three decades are rooted in the KoP. Moreover,
some of the deeper insights obtained by knowledge theory in this field can be derived in a fairly direct
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Figure 1: A simple four-agent system
fashion from the KoP. We will argue and demonstrate that this principle lies at the heart of coordination
in many distributed and multi-agent systems.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 1.1 illustrates the central role of knowledge in a natural
distributed systems application. Section 1.2 provides a high-level discussion of the knowledge of pre-
conditions principle and its connection to coordinating actions. In Section 2 we review and discuss the
modelling of knowledge in the runs and systems model of distributed systems based on [10]. A formal
statement and proof of the KoP are presented in Section 3. Then, in Section 4, the KoP is used to es-
tablish a common knowledge of preconditions principle. It states that in order to perform simultaneously
coordinated actions, agents must first attain common knowledge of any of the actions’ preconditions. An
example of its use is provided in Section 4.1. Section 5 present an additional use of the KoP, and shows
that coordinating a sequence of actions to occur in a prescribed temporal order requires attaining nested
knowledge of their preconditions. Finally, Section 6 discusses additional applications, extensions and
future directions.
1.1 The Case for Knowledge in Distributed Systems
Why should knowledge play a central role in distributed computing? As pointed out in [13], most every-
one who designs or even just tries to study the workings of a distributed protocol is quickly found talking
in terms of knowledge, making statements such as “once the process receives an acknowledgement, it
knows that the other process is ready. . . ”. An essential aspect of distributed systems is the fact that an
agent chooses which action to perform based on the local information available to it, which typically
provides only a partial view of the overall state of the system. To get a sense of the role of knowledge in
distributed systems, consider the following example.
Example 1. Given is a distributed network modeled by a graph, with agents located at the nodes, and the
edges standing for communication channels (see Figure 1). In the problem we shall call Computing the
Max (or CTM for short), each agent i starts out with a natural number vi ∈N as an initial value. The goal
is to have Agent 1 print the maximum of all of the initial values (we denote this value by Max), and print
nothing else. In the instance depicted in Figure 1, the maximal value happens to be 100. Initially, Agent 1
clearly can’t print its own initial value of 75. Suppose that Agent 1 receives a message µ , “v2 = 100”
from Agent 2 reporting that its value is 100. At this point, Agent 1 has access to the maximum, and
printing 100 would satisfy the problem specification. Compare this with a setting that is the same in all
respects, except that Agent 3’s value is v3 = 150. In this case, of course, Max 6= 100 and so printing 100 is
forbidden. But if Agent 1 can receive the same message µ under similar circumstances in both scenarios,
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then it is unable to distinguish whether or not Max = 100 upon receiving µ . Intuitively, even in the first
scenario, the agent does not know that Max = 100.
What information does Agent 1 need, then, in order to be able to print the maximum? Notice that
it is not necessary, in general, to collect all of the initial values in order to print the maximum. For
example, suppose that the agents follow a bottom-up protocol in which values are sent from right to left,
starting from Agent 4, and every agent passes to the left the larger of its own value and the value it
received from its neighbor on the right (if such a neighbor exists). In this protocol, Agent 1 can clearly
print the maximum after receiving the message “v2 = 100”, and seeing just one value besides its own.
Interestingly, even collecting all of the values is not a sufficient condition for printing the Max. Imagine
a setting in which the network is as in Figure 1, but Agent 1 considers it possible that there are more than
four nodes in the network. In this case, even if Agent 1 receives all (four) values, it may still need to wait
for proof that there is no additional, larger, value in the system. 
CTM is a simplified example in the spirit of many distributed systems applications. In fact, a central
problem called Leader Election, for example, is often solved by computing a node with maximal ID
[1, 17]. The solution to such a problem is typically in the form of a set of short computer programs
(jointly constituting a distributed protocol), each executed at one of the nodes. When the nodes follow
such a protocol, the resulting execution should satisfy the problem specification. Of course, the programs
are written in a standard programming language, without any reference to knowledge or possibility. In
the vast majority of cases, the programs in question do not enumerate and/or explore possible states or
scenarios. Indeed, the program designer is typically unfamiliar with formal notions of knowledge. This
being the case, what sense does it make to talk of Agent 1 in Example 1 “knowing” or “not knowing”
that Max = c? Can it make sense to say that the Agent “considers it possible that there may be more than
four nodes in the system”? After all, we may be talking about a 10-line program. It has no soul. Does it
have thoughts, doubts and mental states?
Since agents act based on their local information, a protocol designer must ensure that agents ob-
tain the necessary information for a given task, and that this information is applied correctly. Using the
information-based notion of knowledge, the designer can ascribe knowledge to an agent without requir-
ing it to have a soul, feelings, and self-awareness. As seen in the CTM example, it is natural to think in
terms of whether or not Agent 1 knows Max = c at any given point in a run of a protocol solving CTM.
(A formal definition of knowledge will be provided in Section 2.) Suppose that a protocol is designed
to solve CTM in networks that may have a variety of sizes. If Agent 1 does not start out with local
information ensuring that there are no more than four nodes in the system, then from the point of view of
an outside observer the agent can be thought of as “considering it possible” that there may be more than
four nodes.
Even in a simple network as in Figure 1, the CTM problem can be posed in different models, which
can differ in essential aspects. A solution to CTM in one model might not solve the problem in another
model. Indeed, the rationale behind distinct solutions, as well as their details, may vary considerably.
Are there common features shared by all solutions to CTM?
Interestingly, all solutions to CTM, in all models, share one property: Agent 1 must know that
Max = c in order to print the value c. Indeed, the ability to print the answer in a protocol for CTM
reduces to detecting when the Max value is known. Of course, once Agent 1 knows that Max = c it
can safely print c. Hence, knowing that Max = c is not just necessary, but also a sufficient condition
for printing c. The CTM problem shows that knowledge and attaining knowledge can be a central and
crucial aspect of a standard distributed application.
The need to know Max = c in solving CTM suggests that we consider a natural question: When
does Agent 1 know that Max = c? The answer is less straightforward than we might initially expect.
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What is known depends in a crucial way on the protocol that the agents are following. Thus, in the
setting of Example 1, if the agents follow the bottom-up protocol, then Agent 1 knows the maximum
once it receives a single message from Agent 2. Knowledge is also significantly affected by features of
the model. In CTM, if there is an upper bound (say 100) on the possible initial values, then an agent
that sees this value knows the maximum. Knowledge about the network topology and properties of
communication play a role as well. For example, consider a model in which Agent 1 has a clock, and
a single clock cycle suffices for a message to be delivered, digested, and acted upon. Suppose that the
protocol is such that all agents start simultaneously at time 0 and an agent forwards a value towards
Agent 1 only if this value is larger than any value it has previously sent. Then in the network of Figure 1
Agent 1 will receive a message with value 100 from Agent 2 at time 1, and no further messages. If
Agent 1 knows that the diameter of the network is 3, it will not know the maximum upon receiving
this message. However, without receiving any further messages, at time 3 Agent 1 will know that the
maximum is 100; no larger value can be lurking in the system.
1.2 KoP and Coordination
The fact that Max = c is a necessary condition for printing c is an essential feature of the CTM problem.
We have argued that, in fact, K1(Max = c) is also a necessary condition for printing c, as the KoP would
suggest. But this is just one instance. Let us briefly consider another example.
Example 2. Consider a bank whose ATMs are designed in such a way that an ATM will dispense cash
only to a customer whose account shows a sufficiently large positive balance. Along comes Alice, who
has a large positive balance, and tries to obtain a modest sum from the ATM. On this day, however,
the ATM is unable to communicate with the rest of the bank and it declines to pay Alice. Thus, despite
the fact that Alice has good credit, the ATM frustrates her and denies her request. Apparently, given
its specification, the ATM has no choice. Intuitively, in order to satisfy the credit restriction, the ATM
needs to know that a customer has good credit before dispensing cash. If the ATM may pay a customer
that is not known to have good credit, there will be possible scenarios in which the ATM will violate its
specification, and pay a customer that does not have credit. Notice, however, that the specification said
nothing about the ATM’s knowledge. It only imposed a restriction on the ATM’s action, based on the
state of Alice’s account. 
Both the CTM problem and the ATM example are instances in which the KoP clearly applies. The
intuitive argument for why the KoP should apply very broadly is straightforward. If ϕ is a necessary
condition for performing α , and agent i ever performs α without knowing ϕ , then there should be a
possible scenario that is indistinguishable to agent i, in which ϕ does not hold. Since the two scenarios
are indistinguishable, the agent can perform α in the second scenario, and violate the requirement that ϕ
is a necessary condition. A formal statement and proof requires a definition of necessary conditions,
knowledge, as well as capturing a sense in which an action at one point implies the same action at any
other, indistinguishable, point. This will be done in Section 3.
Most tasks in distributed systems are described by way of a specification. Such specifications typ-
ically impose a variety of necessary conditions for actions. The KoP implies that even though such
specifications often do not explicitly discuss the agents’ knowledge, they do in fact impose knowledge
preconditions. Observe that the KoP applies to a task regardless of the means that are used to implement
it. Any engineer implementing a particular task will have to ensure that preconditions are known when
actions are taken. This is true whether or not the engineer reasons explicitly in terms of knowledge, and
it is true even if the engineer is not even aware of the knowledge terminology. (Normally, neither may be
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the case, of course.) The need to satisfy the KoP suggests that the design of distributed implementations
must involve at least two steps. One is to make sure that the required knowledge is made available to
an agent who needs to performed a prescribed action, and the other is ensuring that the agent detect
that it knows the required preconditions. This is quite different from common practice in engineering
distributed implementations [28].
We remark that the KoP can be expected to hold in a variety of multi-agent settings well beyond the
realm of distributed systems. Thus, for example, suppose that a jellyfish is naturally designed so that it
will never sting its own flesh. By the KoP, the cell activating the sting at a given point needs to know
that it is not stinging the jellyfish’s body when it “fires” its sting. The jellyfish is thus designed with
some form of a “friend or foe” mechanism that is used in the course of activating the sting. Various
biological activities can similarly be considered in light of the KoP: How does the organism know that
certain preconditions are met? Our last example will come from the social science arena. Suppose that
a society designs a legal system, that is required to satisfy the constraint that only people who are guilty
of a particular crime are ever put in jail for committing this crime. By the KoP, the judge (or jury) must
know that the person committed this crime in order to send him to jail.
As discussed above, specifications impose preconditions. Typically, these conditions relate an action
to facts about the world (e.g., the maximal value, or the customer’s good credit). In many cases, however,
actions of different agents need to be coordinated. Consider a variant of CTM in which in addition to
Agent 1 printing the maximum, Agent 4 needs to perform an action (say print the same value or print the
minimal value), but not before Agent 1 does. Then Agent 1 performing her action is a condition for 4’s
action. In particular, Agent 4 would need to know that Agent 1 has already come to know Max = c for
some c before 4 acts. In some cases, the identity of actions performed needs to be coordinated.
For a final example, suppose that Alice should perform an action αA only if Bob performs an ac-
tion αB at least 5 time steps earlier. Then she needs to know that Bob acted at least 5 steps before
when she acts. Indeed, if ψ is a necessary condition for αB, then Alice must know that “Bob knew ψ at
least 5 time steps ago” when she acts, since knowing ψ is a necessary condition for Bob’s performing αB
(see [4, 5]). As these examples illustrate, given KoP, coordination can give rise to nested knowledge.
Simple instances of the KoP are often quite straightforward. Ensuring and detecting K1(Max = c)
is often fairly intuitive, and it not justify the overhead involved in developing a theory of knowledge for
multi-agent systems. However, satisfying statements involving nested knowledge in particular models
of computation can quickly become nontrivial. For this, it is best to have a clear mathematical model of
knowledge in multi-agent systems. The next section reviews the runs and systems model.
2 Modeling Knowledge Using Runs and Systems
We now review the runs and systems model of knowledge of [10, 13]. The interested reader should
consult [10] for more details. A global state is an “instantaneous snapshot” of the system at a given time.
Let G denote a set of global states. Time will be identified with the natural numbers N= {0,1,2, . . .} for
ease of exposition. A run is a function r: N→ G associating a global state with each instant of time.
Thus, r(0) is the run’s initial state, r(1) is the next global state, and so on. A system is a set R of runs.
The same global state can appear in different runs, and in some systems may even appear more than once
in the same run.
A central notion in our framework is that of an agent’s local state, whose role is to capture the agent’s
local information at a given point. The precise details of the local state depend on the application. It could
be the complete contents of an agent’s memory at the given instant, or the complete sequence of events
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that it has observed so far. for example. The rule of thumb is that the local state should consist of the
local information that the agent may use when deciding which actions to take. Thus, for example, if
agents are finite-state machines, it is often natural to identify an agent’s local state with the automaton
state that it is in. Formally, we assume that every global state determines a unique local state for each
agent. We denote agent i’s local state in the global state r(t) by ri(t). Moreover, a global state with n
agents A = {1, . . . ,n} will have the form r(t) = 〈re(t),r1(t), . . . ,rn(t)〉, where re(t) is called the local
state of the environment, and will serve to represent all aspects of the global state that are not included in
the agents’ local states. For example, it could represent messages in transit, the current topology of the
network including what links may be down, etc.
2.1 Syntax and Semantics
We are interested in a propositional logic of knowledge, in which propositional facts and epistemic facts
can be expressed. Facts will be considered to be true or false at a point (r, t), with respect to a system R.
More formally, given a setΦ of primitive propositions and a set P= {1, . . . ,n} of the agents in the system,
we define a propositional languageL Kn (Φ) by closingΦ under negation ‘¬’ and conjunction ‘∧’, as well
as under knowledge operators Ki for all i ∈ P (see [14]). Thus, for example, if p,q ∈ Φ are primitive
propositions and i, j ∈ P are agents, then ¬Ki p∧K jKi¬K jq is a formula inL Kn (Φ). We typically omit
the set Φ and callL Kn the language for knowledge with n agents.
In a multi-agent system facts about the world, as well as the knowledge that agents have, can change
dynamically from one time point to the next. We thus consider the truth of formulas ofL Kn at points of a
system R, where a point is a pair (r, t) ∈ R×N, and it is used to refer to time t in the run r. We denote the
set of points of a system R by Pts(R), R×N. Points will play the role of states of a Kripke structure.
The set Φ of primitive propositions used in the analysis of any given multi-agent system R will
depend on the application. Their truth at the points of the system needs to be explicitly defined. This is
done by an interpretation pi : Φ×Pts(R)→ {T,F}, where pi(q,(r, t))= T means that the proposition q
holds at (r, t). Formally, an interpreted system w.r.t. a set Φ of primitive propositions is a pair (R,pi)
consisting of the system R and interpretation pi for Φ over Pts(R). Just as we typically omit explicit
reference to Φ, we shall omit pi as well, when this is unambiguous.
We assume from here on that the environment’s state re(t) in a global state r(t) contains a “history”
component h that records all actions taken by all agents at times 0,1,. . . ,t−1. Formally, we take h to be
a set of triples 〈α, i, t ′〉, which grows monotonically in time. An action α is considered to be performed
by i at the point (r, t) if and only if the triple 〈α, i, t〉, denoting that action α was performed by agent i at
time t, appears in the history component h of re(t ′) for all times t ′ > t.1 For the analysis in this paper,
we will also assume that Φ includes propositions of the form doesi(α) and didi(α) for agents i ∈ P
and actions α . With this assumption, what actions are performed at any given point (r, t) is uniquely
determined by the run r.
We will consider interpretations pi that, on these propositions, are defined by
pi
(
doesi(α),(r, t)
)
= T iff agent i performs α at (r, t)
pi
(
didi(α),(r, t)
)
= T iff pi
(
doesi(α),(r, t ′)
)
= T holds for some t ′ ≤ t
We allow t ′ = t in the definition of didi(α) for technical convenience; it simplifies our later analysis
slightly.
1Our definition does not imply or assume that the actions are observed, observable or recorded by any of the agents. Whether
that is the case depends on the application.
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Our model of knowledge will follow the standard Kripke-style possible worlds approach. The pos-
sibility relations that we use are induced directly from the system R being analyzed; two points are
considered indistinguishable to an agent if its local states at the two points are the same. More formally:
Definition 2.1. If ri(t) = r′i(t ′), then (r, t) and (r′, t ′) are called indistinguishable to i, denoted by
(r, t)≈i (r′, t ′).
Formulae of L Kn are interpreted at a point (r, t) of an interpreted system (R,pi) by means of the
satisfaction relation ‘|=’, which is defined inductively by:
(R,r, t) |= p iff (r, t) ∈ pi(p);
(R,r, t) |= ¬ϕ iff (R,r, t) 6|= ϕ;
(R,r, t) |= ϕ ∧ψ iff both (R,r, t) |= ϕ and (R,r, t) |= ψ;
(R,r, t) |= Kiϕ iff (R,r′, t ′) |= ϕ for all (r′, t ′) ∈ Pts(R) such that (r′, t ′)≈i (r, t).
We say that ϕ is valid in the system R, and write R |= ϕ , if (R,r, t) |= ϕ for all points (r, t) ∈ Pts(R).
We say that ϕ validly implies ψ in R if ϕ ⇒ ψ is valid in R. Since, by Definition 2.1, the ≈i relations
are equivalence relations, each knowledge operator Ki satisfies the S5 axiom system [14]. In particular,
it satisfies the knowledge property (or Knowledge Axiom) that Kiϕ ⇒ ϕ is valid in all systems.
It is instructive to relate our modeling using runs and systems to standard multi-agent Kripke struc-
tures. For every system R there is a corresponding Kripke structure MR = (SR,pi,∼1, . . . ,∼n) for n agents
such that SR = Pts(R) and ‘∼i’ = ‘≈i’ for every i. They correspond in that (R,r, t) |= ϕ iff MR,(r, t) |= ϕ
is guaranteed for all (r, t) ∈ Pts(R) = SR and ϕ ∈L Kn (Φ) (for details, see [10]).
The system R will determine the space of possible runs and possible points, which play a crucial
role in determining the truth of facts involving knowledge. For example, consider a run r in which Alice
sends Bob a message at time 1, and Bob receives it at time 2. If R is a system in which messages may
be lost, or may take longer than one time step to be delivered, then Alice would not know at time 2
(
i.e.,
w.r.t. (R,r,2)
)
that her message has been delivered, because there is another run r′ ∈ R that she cannot
tell apart from r at time 2, in which her message is not (or not yet) delivered by that time. The same run r
also belongs to another system R′ in which messages are always reliably delivered in exactly one round.
With respect to (R′,r,2), however, Alice would know at time 2 that her message has been delivered.
Our definition of knowledge is rather flexible and widely applicable. The set R of the possible runs
immediately induces what the agents know. Observe that the definition of knowledge is completely
external. It ascribes knowledge to agents in the system even if the protocol they follow, as well as the
actions that they perform, do not involve the knowledge terminology in any way. Moreover, the agents
do not need to be complex or sophisticated for the definition to apply. Indeed, in a model of a very simple
system consisting of a bed lamp and its electric cable, a switch in the OFF state can be said to know that
the lamp is not lit; what the same switch would know in the ON state would depend on the system R under
consideration, which determines the runs considered possible. E.g., if R contains a run in which the lamp
is burnt out, then in the ON state the switch would not know that the lamp is shining light. On the other
hand, if the lamp can never burn out, and the cord, plug and switch are in proper working order in all runs
of R, then in the ON state the switch would know that the lamp is shining light. As this example shows,
knowledge under this definition does not require the “knower” to compute what it knows. Indeed, this
definition of knowledge is not sensitive to the computational complexity of determining what is known.
In most cases, of course, we will ascribe knowledge to agents or components that can perform actions,
which is not the case in the light switch example. And agents might need to explicitly establish whether
they know relevant facts. We now provide a statement and proof of the knowledge of preconditions
principle KoP.
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3 Formalizing the Knowledge of Preconditions Principle
Intuitively, the KoP states that if a particular fact ψ is a necessary condition for an agent to perform
an action α , then the agent must in fact know ψ in order to act. In other words, knowing ψ is also a
necessary condition for performing the action. We formalize the claim and prove it as follows. We say
that ψ is a necessary condition for doesi(α) in R if (R,r, t) |= doesi(α) holds only if (R,r, t) |= ψ , for
all (r, t) ∈ Pts(R). Clearly, the customer’s good credit is a necessary condition for the ATM dispensing
cash. That is, suppose that a bank makes use of a correct implementation of an ATM protocol, which
satisfies the credit requirement. Then, in the system R consisting of the set of all possible histories (runs)
of the bank’s (and the ATM’s) transactions, good credit is a necessary condition for receiving cash from
the ATM.
It is often of interest to consider facts whose truth depends only on a given agent’s loca state. Such,
for example, may be the receipt of a message, or the observation of a signal, by the agent. Whether x = 0
for a local variable x, for example, would be a natural local fact. Moreover, if an agent has perfect recall,
then any events that it has observed in the past will give rise to local facts. Finally, since knowledge is
defined based on an agent’s local state, then a fact of the form Kiϕ constitutes a local fact. Indeed, there
is a simple way to define the local facts above using knowledge. Namely, we say that ϕ is i-local in R if
R |= (ϕ ⇒ Kiϕ).
The formalism of [10] defines protocols as explicit objects, and defines contexts that describe the
possible initial states and the model of computation. This provides a convenient and modular way of
constructing systems. Namely, given a protocol P and a context γ , the system R = R(P,γ) is defined to
be the set of all runs of protocol P in γ . The runs of this system embody all of the properties of the
context, as they arise in runs of P. This includes, for example, any timing assumptions, possible values
encountered, possible topologies of the network, etc. They also embody the relevant properties of the
protocol, because in all runs considered possible the agents follow P.
In this paper, we do not define protocols and contexts. Rather, we treat the KoP in a slightly simpler
and more abstract setting. We say that an action α is a conscious action for i in R if i’s local state
completely determines whether i performs α . If its local state at two points (r, t) and (r′, t ′) of R is
the same, then (R,r, t) |= doesi(α) iff (R,r′, t ′) |= doesi(α). Conscious actions are quite prevalent in
many systems of interest. For example, suppose that agent i follows a deterministic protocol, so that its
action at any given point is a function of its local state. If, in addition, agent i is allowed to move at
every time step, then all of its actions are conscious actions. We remark that, since conscious actions
depend on an agent’s local state, then if α is conscious for i in R then (R,r, t) |= doesi(α) holds iff
(R,r, t) |= Kidoesi(α) does, for all (r, t) ∈ Pts(R).
We are now ready to prove a formal version of the KoP:
Theorem 3.1 (The KoP Theorem). Let α be a conscious action for i in R. If ψ is a necessary condition
for doesi(α) in R, then Kiψ is also a necessary condition for doesi(α) in R.
Proof. We will show the contrapositive. Let α be a conscious action for i in R, and assume that Kiψ
is not a necessary condition for doesi(α) in R. Namely, there exists a point (r, t) ∈ Pts(R) such that
both (R,r, t) |= doesi(α) and (R,r, t) 6|= Kiψ . Given the latter, we have by the definition of ‘|=’ for Ki
that there exists a point (r′, t ′) ∈ Pts(R) such that both (r′, t ′) ≈i (r, t) and (R,r′, t ′) 6|= ψ . Since α is a
conscious action for i in R and (R,r, t) |= doesi(α) we have that (R,r, t) |= Kidoesi(α). It follows from
(r′, t ′) ≈i (r, t) by the definition of ‘|=’ for Ki that (R,r′, t ′) |= doesi(α) holds. But since (R,r′, t ′) 6|= ψ ,
we conclude that ψ is not a necessary condition for doesi(α) in R, establishing the countrapositive
claim.
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Theorem 3.1 applies to all multi-agent systems. It immediately implies, for example, that a necessary
condition for the ATM to dispense cash is Katm(good credit). The theorem is model independent; it
does not depend on timing assumptions, on the topology of the system (even on whether agents commu-
nicate by message passing or via reading and writing to registers in a shared memory), or on the nature
of the activity that is carried out. For every necessary condition for a conscious action, knowing that the
condition holds is also a necessary condition.
4 Coordinating Simultaneous Actions
Recall that the languageL Kn contains formulas in which knowledge operators can be nested to arbitrary
finite depth. It is sometimes useful to consider a state of knowledge called common knowledge that goes
beyond any particular nested formula. Intuitively, a fact ψ is common knowledge if everyone knowing
that everyone knows . . . , that everyone knows the fact ψ , to every finite depth. Common knowledge has
a number of equivalent definitions, one of which is as follows:
Definition 4.1 (Common Knowledge). Fix a set of agents G and a fact ψ . We denote by CGψ the fact
that ψ is common knowledge to G. Its truth at points of a system R is defined by:
(R,r, t) |=CGψ iff (R,r, t) |= Ki1Ki2 · · ·Kimψ holds for all 〈i1, i2, . . . , im〉 ∈ Gm and all m≥ 1.
Common knowledge, a term coined by Lewis in [18], plays an important role in the analysis of
games [2], distributed systems [13], and many other multi-agent settings. Clearly, common knowledge
is much stronger than “plain” knowledge. Indeed, CGψ validly implies K jψ , for all agents j ∈ G. Since
common knowledge requires infinitely many facts to hold, it is not a priori obvious that CGϕ can be
attained at a reasonable cost, or even whether it can ever be attained at all, in settings of interest (see [7,
10, 13]). We will now show that there are natural applications for which attaining common knowledge is
essential.
Intuitively, distinct actions are simultaneous in R if they can only be performed together; whenever
one is performed, all of them are performed simultaneously. It is possible to define simultaneous coordi-
nation formally in terms of necessary conditions:
Definition 4.2 (Simultaneous Actions). Let G be a set of agents. We say that a set of actions A = {αi}i∈G
is (necessarily) simultaneous in R if doesi(αi) is a necessary condition for does j(α j) in R, for all
i, j ∈ G.
Suppose that the actions in A are simultaneous in R in the above sense. Then the KoP immediately
implies (by Theorem 3.1) that a necessary condition for performing an action in A is knowing that the
other actions are also (currently) being performed. In fact, however, much more must be true. We now
present a strong variant of the KoP, which shows that in order to perform simultaneous actions agents
must attain common knowledge of their necessary conditions. Notice that in order to allow a set of
actions by the agents in G to be simultaneous, the system R must be sufficiently deterministic to ensure
that if i, j ∈ G are distinct agents and (R,r, t) |= doesi(α) holds, then j will be scheduled to perform an
action at (r, t). For otherwise, there would be no way to ensure simultaneous execution of the actions by
the agents in G. Conscious actions fit this setting well in this case. We proceed as follows.
Theorem 4.3 (C-K of Preconditions). Let G be a set of agents and let A = {αi}i∈G be a set of necessarily
simultaneous actions in the system R. Moreover, suppose that each action αi ∈ A is a conscious action
for its agent i in R. If ψ is a necessary condition for doesi(αi) for some i ∈ G, then CGψ is a necessary
condition for does j(α j), for all j ∈ G.
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Proof. Assume that A is a set of necessarily simultaneous actions for G in R. It is straightforward to
show the following claim.
Observation 1. Let αi,α j ∈ A be the actions for agents i and j, respectively. If a fact ϕ is a necessary
condition for doesi(αi) in R then ϕ is also a necessary condition for does j(α j) in R.
To prove this observation notice that, by assumption, both (a) R |= does j(α j)⇒ doesi(αi) and
(b) R |= doesi(αi)⇒ ϕ hold. For all (r, t) ∈ Pts(R), if (R,r, t) |= does j(α j) then (R,r, t) |= doesi(αi)
holds by (a) and so (R,r, t) |= ϕ by (b). Thus, ϕ is a necessary condition for does j(α j) in R.
Assume that ψ is a necessary condition for doesi(αi), for some i ∈ G. We shall prove by induc-
tion on m ≥ 0 that Ki1Ki2 · · ·Kimψ is a necessary condition for does j(α j) in R, for every j ∈ G and all
sequences 〈i1, . . . , im〉 ∈ Gm (of m agent names from G). This will establish that (R,r, t) |= does j(α j)
implies (R,r, t) |= CGψ for all (r, t) ∈ Pts(R), and thus CGψ is a necessary condition for does j(α j) for
all j ∈ G, as claimed.
• Base case: Let m = 0. The claim in this case is that if ψ is a necessary condition for doesi(αi)
then ψ is also a necessary condition for does j(α j). This is precisely Observation 1, with ϕ , ψ .
• Inductive step: Let m≥ 1, and assume that the claim holds for all j′ ∈G and all sequences in Gm−1.
Fix j ∈ G and a sequence 〈i1, i2, . . . , im〉 ∈ Gm. Its suffix 〈i2, . . . , im〉 is a sequence in Gm−1. Thus,
Ki2 · · ·Kimψ is a necessary condition for doesi1(αi1) by the inductive hypothesis for m− 1 (ap-
plied to Gm−1 and agent j′ = i1 ∈ G). Given that αi1 is a conscious action by i1, we can apply
Theorem 3.1 to the necessary condition Ki2 · · ·Kimψ and obtain that Ki1Ki2 · · ·Kimψ is a necessary
condition for doesi1(αi1). By Observation 1 we have that Ki1Ki2 · · ·Kimψ is also a necessary con-
dition for does j(α j) in R, and we are done.
4.1 Common Knowledge and the Firing Squad Problem
As an illustration of the applicability of Theorem 4.3 to a concrete application, consider a simple version
of the Firing Squad problem. In this instance, the set of agents G in the system must simultaneously
perform an action (say each agent i ∈ G should perform the action firei) in response to the receipt, by
any agent in G, of a particular external input called a ‘go’ message. The firei action can stand for a
simultaneous change in shared copies of a database, a public announcement at different sites of the
system, or any other actions that need to take place simultaneously. Moreover, firei actions are allowed
only if they are preceded by such a go message. For simplicity, we consider a case in which none of the
agents in G may fail, and they all must satisfy the specification.
Let ψgo be a proposition that is true at (r, t) ∈ Pts(R) if a go message is received by any of the agents
in G at a point (r, t ′) of r at a time t ′ ≤ t. According to the specification of the Firing Squad problem, ψgo
is a necessary condition for the firei actions. An immediate consequence of Theorem 4.3 is:
Corollary 4.4. CGψgo is a necessary condition for all firei actions in the Firing Squad problem.
Given Corollary 4.4, any solution to the firing squad problem must first attain common knowledge
that a go message has been received. It is well-known (see [11, 13]) that common knowledge of a fact
is observed simultaneously at all agents it involves. Suppose that every i ∈G performs firei when CGψgo
first holds. Since all agents in G will come to know that CGψgo immediately, they will fire simultaneously,
as required by the problem specification. Indeed, Theorem 4.3 shows that this is the first time at which
they can perform according to a correct protocol. Implementing simultaneous tasks such as the Firing
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Squad therefore inherently involves, and often reduces to, ensuring and detecting CGψgo. Recall that
depending on the properties of the system, attaining such common knowledge might be impossible in
some cases, or it might incur a substantial cost in others. Just as in the case of the KoP, this necessity is
not due to our formalism. It is only exposed by our analysis. In every protocol that implements such a
task correctly, the firing actions cannot be performed unless CGψgo is attained.
There is an extensive literature on using common knowledge to obtain optimal protocols for simul-
taneous tasks [8, 9, 16, 20, 21, 23, 24, 26, 25]. Typically, they involve an explicit proof that common
knowledge of a particular fact is a necessary condition for performing a set A of necessarily simultaneous
actions. Theorem 4.3 or a variant of it suited for fault-tolerant systems can be used to establish this result
in all of these cases. Moreover, one of the main insights from the analysis of [13] and of [11] is that
when simultaneous actions are performed, the participating agents have common knowledge that they
are being performed. Theorem 4.3 is a strict generalization of this fact.
5 Temporally Ordering Actions
So far, we have seen two essential connections between knowledge and coordinated action: performing
actions requires knowledge of their necessary conditions, and performing simultaneous actions requires
common knowledge of their necessary conditions. We now further extend the connection between states
of knowledge and coordination, by showing that temporally ordering actions depends on attaining nested
knowledge of necessary conditions. Following [5], we define temporally ordered actions:
Definition 5.1 (Ben Zvi and Moses). A sequence of actions 〈α1, . . . ,αk〉 (for agents 1, . . . ,k, respectively)
is (linearly) ordered in R if did j−1(α j−1) is a necessary condition for does j(α j) in R.
Observe that this definition does not force an action α j to occur in a run in which α j−1 occurs.
Rather, if an action α j is performed in a given run, then it must be preceded by all actions α1, . . . ,α j−1.
Moreover, if we denote the time at which an action αi is performed in a run r by ti, then we require that
t j−1 ≤ t j for every action α j performed in r.
Claim 1. Assume that the sequence 〈α1, . . . ,αk〉 is ordered in R. Then R |=
(
did j(α j)⇒ did j−1(α j−1)
)
for all 2≤ j ≤ k.
Proof. Assume that (R,r, t) |= did j(α j). Then, by definition of did j(α j), we have (R,r, tˆ ) |= does j(α j)
for some tˆ ≤ t. The fact that 〈α1, . . . ,αk〉 is ordered in R implies that did j−1(α j−1) is a necessary
condition for does j(α j) in the system R, and so (R,r, tˆ ) |= did j−1(α j−1). Since did j−1(α j−1) is a
stable fact and t ≥ tˆ, we obtain that (R,r, t) |= did j−1(α j−1). The claim follows.
We say that a fact ϕ is stable in R if once true, ϕ remains true. Formally, if (R,r, t) |= ϕ and t ′ > t
then (R,r, t ′) |= ϕ , for all r ∈ R and t, t ′ ≥ 0. Notice that while doesi(α) is, in general, not a stable fact,
didi(α) is always stable.
Definition 5.2. We say that agent i recalls ψ in R if the fact Kiψ is stable in R.
The notion of perfect recall, capturing the assumption that agents remember all events that they take
part in, is popular in the analysis of games and multi-agent systems [10, 29]. While perfect recall is
a nontrivial assumption often requiring significant storage costs, selective recall of single facts such as
does j(α j) is a much weaker assumption, that can be assumed of a system R essentially without loss of
generality. By adding a single bit to Agent j’s local state, whose value is 0 as long as j has not performed
α j and 1 once the action has been performed, we can obtain a system R′ that is isomorphic to R, in which
Agent j recalls does j(α j).
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Claim 2. Assume that α j is a conscious action for j in R, and that j recalls did j(α j) in R. Then
did j(α j) is a j-local fact in R.
Proof. Suppose that (R,r, t) |= did j(α j). Then, by definition of did j(α j), we have (R,r, tˆ ) |= does j(α j)
for some tˆ ≤ t. Choose an arbitrary (r′, t ′) ∈ Pts(R) satisfying that (r′, t ′) ≈ j (r, tˆ ). It follows that
(R,r′, t ′) |= does j(α j) since α j is a conscious action for j in R. By definition of did j(α j) it follows
that (R,r′, t ′) |= did j(α j). Now, by definition of |= for K j we have that (R,r, tˆ ) |= K jdid j(α j). By
assumption, j recalls did j(α j) in R, and so K jdid j(α j) is stable in R. Thus, since t ≥ tˆ, we obtain that
(R,r, t) |= K jdid j(α j), as claimed.
We can now show:
Theorem 5.3 (Ordering and Nested Knowledge). Assume that
• the actions 〈α1, . . . ,αk〉 are ordered in R,
• each agent j = 1, . . . ,k recalls did j(α j) in R,
• α j is a conscious action for j in R, for all j = 1, . . . ,k, and
• ψ is a stable necessary condition for the first action does1(α1) in R
Then K jK j−1 · · ·K1ψ is a necessary condition for the j th action does j(α j) in R, for all j ≤ k.
Proof. Assuming the conditions of the theorem, we will prove by induction on j ≤ k that did j(α j)
validly implies K jK j−1 · · ·K1ψ in R. Since does j(α j) validly implies did j(α j) by definition of did j(α j),
this will yield that K jK j−1 · · ·K1ψ is a necessary condition for does j(α j) in R, as claimed. We proceed
with the inductive argument.
• Base case j = 1: Assume that (R,r, t) |= did1(α1). Claim 2 implies that (R,r, t) |= K1did1(α1).
Let (r′, t ′)∈Pts(R) be an arbitrary point satisfying that (r′, t ′)≈1 (r, t). Then (R,r′, t ′) |= did1(α1)
by the knowledge property. Thus, (R,r′, tˆ ) |= does1(α1) holds for some tˆ ≤ t ′, and because ψ is a
necessary condition for does1(α1) in R, we obtain that (R,r, tˆ ) |= ψ . Since ψ is stable and t ′ ≥ tˆ,
we have that (R,r′, t ′) |= ψ . By choice of (r′, t ′) we have that (R,r, t) |= K1ψ , as claimed.
• Inductive step: Let j > 1 and assume that K j−1 · · ·K1ψ is a necessary condition for did j−1(α j−1)
in R. Moreover, let (R,r, t) |= did j(α j). Since α j is a conscious action for j, Claim 2 implies
that (R,r, t) |= K jdid j(α j). Choose an arbitrary (r′, t ′) ∈ Pts(R) satisfying that (r′, t ′)≈ j (r, t). By
definition of K j, it follows that (R,r′, t ′) |= did j(α j). By Claim 1, since the sequence 〈α1, . . . ,αk〉
is ordered in R and j > 1 we have that (R,r′, t ′) |= did j−1(α j−1). We now apply the inductive
hypothesis to obtain that (R,r′, t ′) |=K j−1 · · ·K1ψ . Finally, we obtain that (R,r, t) |=K jK j−1 · · ·K1ψ
by choice of (r′, t ′) and the definition of ‘|=’ for K j. The claim now follows.
A slightly more restricted version of Theorem 5.3 was proved in [5]. Rather than consider an arbitrary
necessary condition for α1, they proved a version for the case in which the first action α1 is triggered by
an external input to agent 1. Technically, the proofs are quite similar.
Theorem 5.3 provides a necessary, but possibly not sufficient, condition for ordering actions in dis-
tributed systems. If agent j acts strictly later than when K jK j−1 · · ·K1ψ first holds, then it may be inappro-
priate for agent j+1 to act when it knows that the fact K jK j−1 · · ·K1ψ holds (i.e., when K j+1K j · · ·K1ψ
first holds). Nevertheless, Theorem 5.3 is often very useful because it can be used as a guide for effi-
ciently, and sometimes even optimally, performing a sequence of ordered actions. Intuitively, suppose
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that we have a protocol whose goal is to perform 〈α1, . . . ,αk〉 in response to an externally generated
trigger ψ (such as the ‘go’ message in Firing Squad). In particular, assume that ψ is a necessary condi-
tion for α1. Keeping the communication aspects of this protocol fixed, an optimally fast solution would
be for each agent j ≤ k to perform α j when K jK j−1 · · ·K1ψ first holds. Let R be the set of runs of
such a protocol with r ∈ R, and let t j and t j−1 be the earliest times at which (R,r, t j) |= K jK j−1 · · ·K1ψ
and (R,r, t j−1) |= K j−1 · · ·K1ψ hold in a run r, respectively. The knowledge property guarantees that
K jK j−1 · · ·K1ψ validly implies that K j−1 · · ·K1ψ in R, and so t j ≥ t j−1. Since, by assumption, α j is
performed at time t j and α j−1 at t j−1, we have that agents perform actions in linear temporal order, as
required by Definition 5.1. Clearly, none of the actions can be performed any earlier, as Theorem 5.3
shows. We conclude that in time-efficient protocols, the nested knowledge formula presented by the
theorem can be both necessary and sufficient. In this sense, Theorem 5.3 suggests a recipe for obtaining
time-efficient solutions for ordering actions.
Just as Theorem 4.3 implies that common knowledge is a necessary condition for simultaneous ac-
tions, we now have by Theorem 5.3 that nested knowledge is a necessary condition for performing actions
in linear temporal order. And just as there is an established literature on when common knowledge is
and is not attainable and on how it may arise, there are results concerning the communication structure
that underlies attaining nested knowledge. Indeed, in a seminal paper [7], Chandy and Misra showed that
in asynchronous systems R, if (R,r, t) |= ¬ϕ and at a time t ′ > t (R,r, t ′) |= K jK j−1 · · ·K1ϕ , then there
must be a message chain in the run r between times t and t ′, passing through the agents 1,2,. . . , j in this
order (possibly involving additional agents as well). Given Theorem 5.3, this implies that the only way
to coordinate actions in a linear temporal order in an asynchronous setting is by way of such message
chains.2
More recently, Ben Zvi and Moses extended Chandy and Misra’s work to systems in which commu-
nication is not asynchronous, but rather agents may have access to clocks and the transmission time for
each of the channels is bounded [5]. They show that a communication structure called a centipede must
be constructed in order to obtain nested knowledge of spontaneous facts such as the arrival of an external
input. They prove a slightly more restricted instance of Theorem 5.3 (without using KoP directly), and
use it to show that ordering actions in their setting requires the construction of the appropriate centipedes.
Finally, Parikh and Krasucki analyze the ability to create levels of knowledge consisting of collections of
nested knowledge formulas in [27]. Theorem 5.3 relates levels of knowledge to coordination.
6 Discussion
This paper formulated the knowledge of preconditions principle and presented three theorems relating
knowledge and coordinated action: the first is the KoP itself—necessary conditions for an action must be
known to hold when the action is performed. Next, we showed that necessary conditions for simultaneous
actions must be commonly known when the actions are taken. Finally, nested knowledge is a necessary
condition for coordinating linearly ordered actions. The latter two are fairly direct consequences of the
KoP. We discussed some of the uses of the latter two results in Sections 4 and 5. Indeed the KoP has
many further implications.
In recent years, several works that make use of KoP have appeared, citing the unpublished [22].
For example, Castan˜eda, Gonczarowski and Moses used the KoP to analyze the consensus problem [6],
2Theorems 3.1 and 5.3 depend on conscious actions and therefore do not apply to asynchronous systems. Nevertheless,
variants of these theorems can be presented that do apply to asynchronous systems and nondeterministic protocols. Details will
appear in [22].
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in which agents need to agree on a binary value in a fault-prone system. They designed a protocol in
two steps—applying the KoP once to derive a rule by which, roughly, agents decide on 0 when they
know of an initial value of 0. Then, they applied the KoP again assuming that this is the rule used for
making decisions on 0, and obtained a rule involving nested knowledge (roughly, a statement of the
form “knowing that nobody knows 0”) for deciding on the value 1. The result of their analysis was a
very efficient solution to consensus that is optimal in a strong sense: It is the first unbeatable consensus
protocol. No protocol can strictly dominate it, by having processes always decide at least as fast, and
sometimes strictly faster, than this protocol does. The work of [6] complements an earlier work by
Halpern, Moses and Waarts [15], in which a fixed point analysis of optimal consensus was obtained. The
latter, too, is closely related to the KoP.
Gonczarowski and Moses used the KoP to analyze the epistemic requirements of more general forms
of coordination [12]. Namely, they considered a setting in which k agents need to perform actions, and
there are time bounds on the relative times at which the actions of any pair of agents is performed. The
simple instance in which all bounds are 0 is precisely that of the simultaneous actions considered in Sec-
tion 4. They show that such coordination requires vectorial fixed points of knowledge conditions, which
are naturally related to fixed points and equilibria. The papers [3, 4, 5, 12] together can all be viewed
as making use of the KoP to provide insights into the interaction between time and communication for
coordinating actions in a distributed and multi-agent system. Describing them is beyond the scope of the
current paper.
The most significant aspect of the KoP, in our view, is the fact that it places a new emphasis on
the epistemic aspects of problem solving in a multi-agent system. Simple necessary conditions induce
epistemic conditions. Thus, in order to act correctly, one needs a mechanism ensuring that the agents
obtain the necessary knowledge, and that they discover that they have this knowledge. Most problems and
solutions are not posed or described in this fashion. We believe that the KoP encapsulates an important
connection between knowledge, action and coordination that will find many applications in the future.
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